University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

Spring 2011

Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence,
and Subnational Symmetry in the United States and Spain
James A. Gardner
University at Buffalo School of Law

Antoni Abat i Ninet

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. Gardner & Antoni A. i Ninet, Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence,
and Subnational Symmetry in the United States and Spain, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 491 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/205

James A. Gardner, Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in
the United States and Spain, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 491 (2011), 10.5131/AJCL.2010.0019.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

SUSTAINABLE DECENTRALIZATION:
POWER, EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE,
AND SUBNATIONAL SYMMETRY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN
James A. Gardner
University at Buffalo Law School
State University of New York
Antoni Abad i Ninet
Institute of Law and Technology
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
and
University at Buffalo Law School
State University of New York

Forthcoming, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 58 (April, 2011)

Abstract
In the Madisonian tradition of constitutional design, the foundation of a sustainable
federalism is thought to be a scientifically precise balancing of national and subnational power.
Experience shows, however, that national and subnational actors in highly diverse systems are
capable of developing a rich array of extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence, so that the
formal, constitutionalized balance of power rarely settles the question of the actual balance of
power between levels of government. A more important factor in ensuring the long-term
sustainability of a meaningfully federal system is the degree of symmetry across subnational
units in their relation to the central state. A comparison of the U.S. and Spain suggests that
federalism is most directly threatened when subnational units compete not collectively with the
central state, thereby checking its power, but with each other, a condition that furnishes the
central state with opportunities to exploit subnational rivalries in ways that risk genuine,
long-term destabilization.
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SUSTAINABLE DECENTRALIZATION:
POWER, EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE,
AND SUBNATIONAL SYMMETRY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN
James A. Gardner*
Antoni Abad i Ninet**

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the middle of the last century, a consensus seems to have begun to emerge, at least
in the West, that the modern nation state is best and most sensibly organized when its domestic
powers are to some degree decentralized. Whether rooted in a post-War fear of tightly
centralized power as a route to tyranny, a post-Communist rejection of the feasibility of central
state planning, or any of a host of welfarist theories that are frequently invoked to justify
contemporary federalism, decentralization of official power has come to be seen as essential to
good governance, if not indeed indispensable to the successful and sustainable practice of mass
democracy. Many of the world’s most successful new democracies, along with those that aspire
to success (e.g., India, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina) have been founded or refounded on
formal principles of federalism. Other nations that have already enjoyed success as democracies
have sought to ensure it in the future through deliberate programs of devolution and
decentralization (e.g., United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy). And of course this very question has
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dominated recent debates and negotiations concerning the ultimate structure of the European
Union.
This commitment to decentralization does not, however, rest on the belief that democracy
somehow entails decentralization as a matter of theoretical necessity. Indeed, in some respects
the formal structures of federalism stand in opposition to national democratic aspirations, as the
recent American agitation over the Electoral College attests. Rather, the spreading commitment
to decentralization seems to flow more from a pragmatic belief that democratic self-governance
is best sustained over the long term when state power is shared to at least some extent, and for at
least some purposes, by national and subnational levels of government. As a result, some of the
most pressing questions facing modern democratic states and constitutional designers concern
the degree to which power should be decentralized and the kinds of institutions that are best
capable of sustaining the pragmatically ideal distribution of national and subnational power in
any given place.
In modern constitutional law, these concerns typically manifest themselves in two closely
related aspects of constitutional structure: (1) the specific constitutional allocation of
competencies (powers) to each level of government; and (2) the general constitutional default
rule dictating where power presumptively lies when the constitution is silent. Especially in the
Madisonian tradition of constitutional design, in which a scientifically precise balancing of
opposing forces is seen as the key to institutional sustainability,1 achieving just the right
combination of express power allocations and residual power default rules is typically thought to
1

The Federalist, Nos. 48-51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). The prevalence of
scientific imagery and the aspiration to scientific validity in the constitutional thought of the founding generation is
well-documented in Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture
(1986). See also, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (describing the constitutional system of separated
powers as “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure”).
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be the indispensable foundation for a successful decentralized state. An appropriate
constitutional symmetry between national and subnational power, in other words, is the
precondition for a sustainable decentralization of official power. To give too much power to the
national government risks an inward collapse toward centralization and its attendant dangers; to
give excessive power to subnational units risks the fragmentation of the state and the consequent
loss of the many benefits and protections it might otherwise provide.
In this paper, we wish to dispute this account. In our view, constitutional allocations of
power and default rules are not the most important factors determining the long-term viability of
federal or otherwise decentralized states. In fact, experience shows that national and
subnational actors are capable of developing a rich array of extraconstitutional methods of
mutual influence, and that the formal, constitutionalized balance of power therefore rarely settles
the question of the actual balance of power between levels of government. Initial asymmetries
of power enshrined in constitutions can thus be altered by informal arrangements and
workarounds, moderating the dangers of instability posed by ill-advised or poorly executed
initial constitutional endowments.
In contrast, we contend that a more important factor in ensuring the long-term
sustainability of a meaningfully federal system is the degree of symmetry across subnational
units (states, provinces, cantons, Länder, etc.) in their relation to the central state. The real
threat to the stable, long-term exercise of decentralized forms of power arises when subnational
units develop interests in their relation to national power that conflict with the interests of other
such units. To put this proposition in its most general terms, federalism and other forms of
decentralization are most directly threatened when subnational units fail to maintain a united
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front in dealing with national power. In these circumstances, states and provinces compete not
collectively with the central state, thereby checking its power, but with each other, a condition
that furnishes the central state with opportunities to exploit subnational rivalries in ways that risk
genuine, long-term destabilization.
Asymmetry of power, we therefore conclude, is more dangerous in its horizontal than in
its vertical dimension. We will demonstrate this proposition with numerous examples from two
systems that strike very different balances: the United States and Spain. The argument proceeds
as follows. Part II of this paper describes the Madisonian model of contestatory federalism, in
which system-wide stability – and ultimately individual liberty – is secured as a matter of
constitutional design by the exacting allocations of national and subnational power. Part III
demonstrates that a vertically symmetrical initial constitutional allocation of power is less
important than the Madisonian model predicts because of the ability of official actors to develop
significant extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence. This allows each level of
government to check the other’s power in ways that the long-term stability of the system may
require, but for which no formal constitutional provision has been made. Such avenues of
influence, moreover, are capable of arising in widely divergent systems characterized by very
different initial constitutional allocations of power.
Part IV demonstrates that a much more serious long-term threat to the sustainability of
balanced, decentralized power can arise from horizontal asymmetry of interests across
subnational units. Here, much can be learned from a comparison between the generally uniform
relations of the American states to the United States government, on the one hand, and the
starkly divergent relations between Spanish Autonomous Communities and the Spanish central
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government, on the other. Moreover, we will argue, in the presence of such horizontal
asymmetry of interest, the design of constitutional structures of national-subnational relations
can have important and unanticipated consequences.

II. THE MADISONIAN MODEL OF CONTESTATORY FEDERALISM
There are many different kinds of, and justifications for, federal and other decentralized
arrangements of governmental power.2 Here, however, we focus on “contestatory” federalism,
a conception of divided power that justifies federalism as a method of protecting liberty through
the institutionalization of a permanent contest for power between national and subnational units
of government. This is the justification most closely associated with the brand of federalism
practiced in the United States, and most clearly articulated by James Madison in 1787.3
“The accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands,” wrote Madison in Federalist
No. 47, “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”4 To protect liberty, on this
view, power must be divided. Federalism serves this purpose by parceling out government
powers among different levels of government, giving each level of government, national and
subnational, powers sufficient to allow each to monitor and check the abuses of the other.5
Although power is fragmented in such a system, its use is unified because each level of

2

See, e.g., Thomas Dye, American Federalism (1990); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism
(2009), ch. 3; Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (1984).
3

This section draws liberally on James A. Gardner, In Search of Subnational Constitutionalism, 4
Eur. Const. L. Rev. 325 (2008).
4

The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 47, at 301.

5

Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after
Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 380-95.
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government pursues the same goal: serving the interests of the people.6

As Madison put it,

“[t]he federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.”7

Federalism, on this

model, is a dynamic system designed to be manipulated by the people to produce results they
desire. Hamilton put this point clearly:
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general
government. The people, by throwing themselves into the scale, will infallibly
make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of
the other as the instrument of redress.8
On the American Framers’ view of federalism, then, popular allegiance to any government is not
organically fixed, but rather will ebb and flow according to that government’s instrumental value
to the populace at any given time.9 Contestatory federalism therefore does not define a static
relation among national and subnational governments, but a living, dynamic one, and subnational
governments must accordingly have sufficient autonomy and power to play their assigned roles.

6

Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic 23 (1987).

7

The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 46 (Madison), at 294.

8

The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 28 (Hamilton), at 180-81.

9

Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987); Martin Landau,
Federalism, Redundancy, and System Reliability, 3 Publius 173 (1973); Dye, supra note 2, at 6; Todd E. Pettys,
Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 329 (2003).
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Precisely how much power, then, must each level of government possess in order to
create a system of perpetual, mutual conflict among levels of government? Madison never
purports to provide a universal answer to this question, even if he thought one existed, but he
does suggest that to design a successful and sustainable constitutional system of federalism
requires considerable forethought and painstaking calculation of an almost scientific quality.
The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed this view, describing the constitutional allocation of
government power as “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure”10 that
generally requires strict judicial policing to prevent deviations from the constitutional plan.11
Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of U.S. national power in the twentieth century,
contestatory federalism to this day is woven into the structure of American intergovernmental
relations. Although it does not describe the historically dominant relationship between the state
and national governments, which has more often been cooperative than hostile,12
intergovernmental contestation remains nonetheless a background potentiality built into the
system that influences the ways in which the two levels of government interact.13

10

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); on the scientific metaphor, see generally Kammen,

supra note 1.
11

A host of other Supreme Court decisions illustrate the Court’s belief that painstaking fidelity to the
original plan of power allocation is required for the long-term survival of the constitutional system, and ultimately of
liberty itself. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Although it
is by no means clear that constitutional allocations of power were meant originally to be enforced judicially –
Madison certainly seemed to contemplate a more overtly political form of contestation and struggle – the Supreme
Court early on construed its own role to be one of umpiring disputes between state and national power, and deciding
them in accordance with constitutionalized decisions concerning power allocations. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316 (1819).
12

Morton Grodzkins, The American System: A New View of Government (1968); Elazar, supra

note 2.
13

See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (2008) (describing
“sanctions” designed into federal systems).
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Consequently, the American states have frequently understood themselves, and have been
understood by their inhabitants, as important, autonomous, and often effective defenders of the
interests of the local citizenry against the central state. As Madison anticipated, U.S. states have
a long record of inserting themselves between their citizens and Washington, and of deploying
their powers in ways intended self-consciously to thwart the operation of national policies that
they have determined to be destructive of their citizens’ liberties and others interests. Examples
include the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, which loudly protested the national
government’s suppression of political criticism; the Nullification Crisis of 1832, in which South
Carolina threatened to use force to prevent national customs officials from collecting tariffs on
goods unloaded in Charleston Harbor; numerous instances in which states have refused to
cooperate with national officials in the implementation of national regulatory regimes; and the
frequent use today by states of lawsuits to challenge national regulatory authority.14

III. VERTICAL SYMMETRY OF POWER AND EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL AVENUES OF INFLUENCE
The constitutional decentralization of governmental power may be achieved in many
different ways. Powers may be expressly allocated to different levels of government. Such
powers may be granted exclusively to one level of government, or they may be concurrent. If
concurrent, they may be shared across the range of possible uses of the power, or different
aspects of the power may be isolated and parceled out to different levels of government. Where
concurrent powers come into conflict, such conflicts may be resolved in favor of one level or the

14

These and many other incidents are described in James A. Gardner, Interpreting State
Constitutions (2005), ch. 3.
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other. Where the constitution is silent, default rules may provide for the allocation of residual
power to one level or another.15
Such constitutional allocations of power doubtless have important ramifications for both
the possibility of mutual checking in a federal system and its efficacy. Nevertheless,
constitutional rules of power allocation do not structure national-subnational relations in their
entirety, nor do they provide the exclusive means by which national and subnational power may
mutually check each other. Instead, some potential seems always to exist for the development
of informal and extraconstitutional means of mutual influence among levels of government.
Here, we illustrate the emergence of such methods of influence in two systems with very
different initial power allocations: the American system of formal federalism, and the Spanish
system of decentralization by sufferance.

A. THE UNITED STATES: SUBNATIONAL POWER IN A REGIME OF
UNPLANNED NATIONAL CENTRALIZATION
The contemporary allocation of power between the national and subnational governments
in the United States has wandered far from the original constitutional plan. Members of the
founding generation were for the most part deeply suspicious of concentrated, centralized power,
the model of national empire against which they revolted.16 As a result, even those who
professed the need to create a stabilizing central authority agreed that doing so entailed serious
risks. The Framers solved this problem by creating a national government which they believed
would have the power to do what needed to be done nationally, but nothing else – a national

15

See Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (3d ed. 2008), for numerous examples.

16

Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise

101-102 (2008).
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government of strong but nevertheless limited powers. This solution was implemented through
a constitutional decentralization of power that created a national government of limited and
enumerated powers and allocated all general and residual powers to the subnational level.17
During the republic’s first half-century, the actual balance of power between national and
subnational power adhered closely to the original plan. The states dominated most aspects of
public affairs, the national government remained small and relatively weak, and the political
identity of most Americans revolved around their state and local governments rather than the
nation.18 The Civil War marked the beginning of a long period of change in this constitutional
settlement. Successful prosecution of the war required, for the first time, a significant
accumulation of power at the national level and even, according to some historians, the invention
and deliberate propagation of a national identity to legitimate the sacrifices that northerners and
unionists were asked to endure, and to justify the eventual reuniting by force of the continental
nation.19
By the late twentieth century, the conditions of modernity had intruded so far on the
original constitutional plan that the actual distribution of power between national and subnational
governments tipped dramatically in favor of national power. The growth of the administrative
state, the exigencies of fighting two world wars and the Great Depression, and the ultimately
supportive role of the federal government in the civil rights movement conferred great legitimacy

17

U.S. Const., amend. X: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316 (1819).
18

Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 Rutgers
Law Journal 911 (1993).
19

E.g., Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776-1861 (1964).
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on the national government at the expense of the states.20 During a period spanning more than
four decades, moreover, the Supreme Court conferred constitutional legitimacy on these
developments in a series of rulings that ratified the huge expansion of national power that had
occurred in practice.21
In these circumstances, it might be assumed that subnational power in the United States
has become largely irrelevant, yet this is far from true. In fact, even in conditions that are
hostile to the effective exercise of formal subnational power, the American states have
nevertheless managed to develop a wide variety of techniques – some clearly contemplated by
the Constitution, others less so – for successfully protecting themselves against national power,
asserting the interests of their citizens against invasion by the national government, and
influencing the direction and content of national policy.
1.

Threats of Violent Resistance. Among the most potent – and riskiest –

extraconstitutional strategies American states have employed is the use or threat of force to resist
exercises of national power.22 Although the ultimate use of force – secession – failed badly,
states have occasionally resorted to force in smaller and more calculated ways to get what they
want. The Nullification Crisis is probably the most prominent example. In 1832, the national
government enacted a protectionist tariff that many Southerners felt benefitted northern
industrial interests at the expense of the southern economic interest in agricultural exports. In
response, South Carolina raised a small army, which it threatened to deploy to block any effort

20

Feeley and Rubin, supra note 16, at 110-15.

21

E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
22

The following examples are drawn from Gardner, supra note 14.
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by national customs officials to collect the tariff in the port of Charleston. The threat of
violence was eventually defused when the national government took careful steps to avoid any
outright provocation, and South Carolina ultimately backed down from its threat to use force.
Nevertheless, shortly after resolution of the crisis, Congress in 1834 enacted the Compromise
Tariff, which phased out over a period of nine years the provisions to which South Carolinians
objected.23 While South Carolina was not able to obtain precisely what it wanted, as quickly as
it wanted, its threatened use of force clearly influenced the content of national law.
Another, more recent example of a state’s threatened use of force is the 1957
saber-rattling of Arkansas in response to national efforts to implement a federal judicial order
requiring the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, the state capital. Arkansas
Governor Orval Faubus, vowing to resist federal enforcement of the desegregation order,
deployed the National Guard at the school forcibly to prevent the student plaintiffs from entering
the building.24 As a confrontation brewed, the governor withdrew the troops, leaving the
students to face a white mob. President Eisenhower then sent in a thousand troops from the
101st Airborne Division, a regular United States military unit, to enforce the court order and keep
the peace.25
Even more recently, states have threatened physical confrontation with the national
government over issues of environmental policy. Prompted largely by national legislation that
restricted grazing on public lands, Nevada in 1979 enacted legislation “declaring state

23

For a good account of these events, see William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (1966).
24

See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 (1989), at 222-24.

25

Id.
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sovereignty over 49 million acres of Nevada territory” owned by the national government and
managed by the Bureau of Land Management.26 Although this so-called “Sagebrush
Rebellion”27 never led to organized violence against the national government by any state, a
more serious incident occurred in 1988 when Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus deployed police at
the state border to seize a railway shipment of radioactive waste generated at a federal nuclear
facility in Colorado.28 Andrus had the shipment seized pursuant to a state-declared policy of
refusing to accept additional nuclear waste from out-of-state. As recently as 2002, the Governor
of South Carolina made a similar threat to block at the border trucks containing weapons-grade
plutonium destined for a federal storage site in the state.29
2.

Weak Defiance. In addition to these outright illegal means of resisting national

power, states also have at their disposal a number of what might be termed “quasi-legal”
strategies for influencing national policy. One such strategy is a deliberate failure fully to
comply with or to enforce binding federal law. Here, the state does not overtly defy national
law, but nevertheless attempts, in the guise of implementing it, to undermine it by half-hearted or
inappropriate measures. For example, in 1975, as part of an energy policy designed to conserve
oil, Congress lowered the speed limit on all roads to 55 miles per hour. While most states
responded by complying, Montana complied in an extremely half-hearted way. Instead of

26

Paul Wallace Gates, Pressure Groups and Recent American Land Policies 3 (1980).

27

For an overview of this “sagebrush rebellion,” see William L. Graf, Wilderness Preservation and
the Sagebrush Rebellions 225-32 (1990); R. McGreggor Cawley, Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush
Rebellion and Environmental Politics 109-10 (1993).
28

Fox Butterfield, Idaho Firm on Barring Atomic Waste, New York Times, Oct. 23, 1988, 1:32.

29

David Firestone, S. Carolina Battles U.S. on Plutonium, New York Times, Apr. 12, 2002, at A21;
Matthew Boedy, Governor Declares State of Emergency, Augusta Chronicle, June 15, 2002, at A01.
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enforcing violations of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit as traffic infractions, it issued five-dollar
“environmental” citations to drivers traveling above 55 m.p.h., but below what Montana police
considered a safe speed.30 Violations were not charged against drivers’ insurance records. This
kind of “enforcement” worked to undermine the congressional objective since it both declared
quite plainly the state’s continuing opposition to the national policy, and all but invited the public
to exceed the national speed limit with impunity within the borders of the state — an invitation
that drivers, predictably, took up with enthusiasm.31
3.

Political Influence. In addition to resistance and defiance, American states have

several fully legal avenues of recourse to influence the way in which national power is exercised.
First and foremost is the influence of national legislation through political means.32 State
officials often have the capacity, for example, to press the state’s congressional delegation to
work for the enactment at the national level of policies favored by the state.33 For a decade, this
view of state influence induced the United States Supreme Court to abandon any attempt to
enforce constitutional limits on the national commerce power, a position from which it has since

30

According to news accounts, the “conventional wisdom” was that no serious infractions would be
charged for daytime driving below about 85 mph in good weather conditions. Tom Kenworthy, New Life in the
Fast Lane: Wide-Open Throttles in Wide Open Spaces, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1995, at A3.
31

Robert E. King and Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 157-162
(1999); Timothy Egan, Speeding Is Easy (and Almost Free) in Montana, New York Times, July 10, 1989, at A14:3.
32

See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); Jesse Choper, Judicial
Review and the National Political Process (1980).
33

See Donald H. Hadier, When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and
Intergovernmental Lobbying (1974); Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental
Lobbying and the Federal System (1995); John Dinan, State Government Influence in the National Policy Process:
Lessons from the 104th Congress, 27 Publius 129 (1997).
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backed away.34

In an important study, Larry Kramer has suggested that political negotiation

coordinated under the auspices of the national political parties has evolved into the single most
important mechanism by which states influence the behavior of national officials.35 Through
such means, state officials may head off legislation of which they disapprove before it is enacted,
or obtain modifications of proposed national policies that eliminate or moderate provisions to
which state officials object. As the Supreme Court observed more than twenty years ago:
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests
is apparent . . . in the course of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States
have been able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues into their own
treasuries in the form of general and program-specific grants in aid. . . . As a
result, federal grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local
government expenditures. . . . Moreover, at the same time that the States have
exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they have been able to exempt
themselves from a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the
Commerce Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National Labor
Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security

34

Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), with
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
35

Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum.
L. Rev. 215 (2000).
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Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States
and their subdivisions.36
As this account suggests, the states have been able successfully to exploit their political influence
in Washington to obtain many benefits and concessions from the national government.37
4.

Withholding of Necessary Cooperation. Even where the national government has

exercised its power in ways that states find objectionable, they often are not deprived entirely of
the means to ameliorate what they perceive to be negative influences of that power on the state’s
citizenry. As the Framers anticipated, the successful invocation of national power sometimes
requires the cooperation of state officials.38 In recognition of this requirement of
intergovernmental cooperation, Congress has frequently structured national programs so as to
delegate to state officials a crucial role in the implementation and enforcement of the programs.
All of the largest and most costly non-military domestic national programs — social security,
welfare, food stamps, and so on — delegate much of the responsibility for the day-to-day
operation of the programs to the states.39 State responsibility for running these programs may
include setting eligibility requirements, determining benefit levels, or enforcing compliance with

36

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985).

37

For a recent, sustained, and detailed account of how states have successfully used their power in
this way, see John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National
Policymaking (2009).
38

The Federalist, supra note 1, No. 27 (Hamilton), at 176-77.

39

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (establishing federal grants to states for welfare programs and
delegating to states substantial discretion as to how to meet programmatic goals); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397, 1397a
(establishing federal social security block grants and setting out goals states are to meet in administration of the
grants).
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programmatic requirements, functions that require the exercise of a significant amount of official
discretion.40
When the national government grants states this kind of significant responsibility for
implementing national initiatives, it often does so by establishing parameters that define the outer
boundaries of state discretion.41 Nevertheless, within these boundaries, state officials may often
have room to bend their implementation of national policy in ways that also serve state interests,
even when those interests are opposed to successful implementation of the national program.42
Even more straightforwardly, states may simply refuse financial incentives offered by the
national government to secure state cooperation.43 For example, New Hampshire has refused
repeatedly to enact a mandatory seatbelt law, thereby forgoing a portion of its allocation of
federal highway maintenance and construction funds.44 Nevada and Wisconsin for years
sacrificed federal highway funds by refusing to lower their statutory threshold for drunken
driving convictions to a blood alcohol level of 0.8 percent, in defiance of federal law requiring
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the adjustment.45 Kentucky abolished state vehicle emission standards, threatening its ability to
meet federally mandated pollution limits, which would lead to the loss of nearly $2 billion in
federal highway funds.46
5.

Recourse to Law. Another fully legal and formally recognized way in which

American states influence policy-making by the national legislative and executive branches is by
invoking the power of the national judicial branch against them. States have often had success
suing the federal government in federal court over alleged abuses of national authority. In 1992,
for example, New York successfully sued the United States in federal court, obtaining a ruling
invalidating a portion of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985 on the ground that one of its provisions exceeded national authority under the Commerce
Clause.47 In subsequent years, federal courts have at the behest of states or state agencies
invalidated numerous other federal statutes on similar grounds.48 In each of these cases, a
federal court has held that some piece of national legislation exceeded the limits of enumerated
national powers.
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B. SPAIN: SUBNATIONAL POWER IN A REGIME OF
DECENTRALIZATION BY SUFFERANCE
1. Constitutional Allocation of Power in Favor of the Central State
The present Spanish Constitution was adopted in 1978 following the fall of the Franco
regime. In response to fears in many quarters that the sudden easing of decades of central
repression might quickly lead to a disintegration of a newly refounded, democratic Spanish state,
the Spanish Constitution was drafted to create an extremely powerful and highly centralized
national government – far more so than the government of the United States.
The Spanish Constitution begins with an emphatic statement of national identity.
“National sovereignty,” it proclaims, “belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all state
powers emanate.”49 “The Constitution,” it goes on, “is based on the indissoluble unity of the
Spanish Nation.”50 Despite this fundamental commitment to a national model, the Spanish
Constitution contains elaborate provisions authorizing a substantial degree of decentralization of
power. Indeed, in many respects the Spanish Constitution looks very much as though it
contemplates the creation of a federal-style state, albeit by different means than are ordinarily
employed by most federations. The promise of these provisions, however, is undermined by a
small number of key provisions that dramatically diminish the possibility of meaningful formal
Spanish subnational autonomy.
Early on, in acknowledgment of Spain’s long history of shifting regional power and its
deep cultural diversity, the Spanish Constitution “recognizes and guarantees the right to
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self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed.”51 An entire chapter
of the Constitution appears to make good on this promise by recognizing the “right to
self-government” of Autonomous Communities (Communidades Autónomas), which it defines
to include “bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics”
and “provinces with a historic regional status.”52 Several sections follow this provision that, as
in virtually every constitution drafted since the end of World War II, parcel out the various
competencies of the national and subnational governments into those that are exclusively
national, those that may be exercised exclusively by subnational units, and those that may in
certain circumstances be exercised concurrently at both levels.53 On paper, the division of
competencies is not weighted especially in favor of either national or subnational power, and to
the casual reader probably does not look all that different from the division of competencies
found in the constitutions of established federal states such as Germany or Austria.
Where the Spanish Constitution differs dramatically from standard European models of
constitutional federalism, however, is in the mechanism it creates to devolve power to the
Autonomies, one weighted heavily toward the central state. This is because neither the
existence nor the powers of any Autonomous Community is guaranteed, or even recognized, by
the Spanish Constitution. Rather, the Constitution delegates all decisions to recognize and
empower Autonomous Communities entirely to the Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) as
matters of purely legislative discretion. Thus, Section 144 provides: “The Cortes Generales
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may, . . . by an organic act . . . [a]uthorize the setting up of a Self-governing Community.”54
Although the provinces seeking recognition as an Autonomous Community in the first instance
draft a Statute of Autonomy (Estatuto de Autonomía) for parliamentary consideration,55
Parliament is free to alter the proposed statute.56 Moreover, even though the Constitution
expressly provides that an approved Statute of Autonomy “shall be the basic institutional rule of
each Self-governing Community”57 – that is, shall function as a subnational constitution – it also
provides that any and all amendments to the Statutes must be approved by the Spanish
Parliament.58
In giving the central government virtually unlimited power to approve both the creation
of Autonomous Communities and their assumption of constitutionally authorized powers of
self-governance, the Spanish Constitution departs significantly from the most common model of
constitutional federalism. In federal states, the authority of subnational units to govern
themselves, and the powers they may exercise, are typically provided by the constitution, not by
the national legislature. Even where the legislature retains authority to recognize new
self-governing subnational units, as in the United States,59 or to rearrange the boundaries of
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existing ones, as in Germany,60 subnational units once recognized retain their autonomy and
powers independently of the wishes or actions of the central government. The Spanish model,
in contrast, more closely approximates what Americans will recognize as the Dillon’s Rule
model of local home rule. Under this model, localities owe their existence, along with each and
every power they are permitted to exercise, to the discretion of the central legislature – a model
long understood in the U.S. to make local power almost entirely dependent on central
beneficence.61
The constitutional decision to make the possibility and scope of subnational
self-governance dependent on the central state is weighted even further in favor of the state by
the fact that the Spanish Constitution provides Autonomous Communities no formal role in the
official decision making processes of the Spanish government. In many decentralized states, the
national government is structured to include some venue in which subnational units may
officially voice their interests as autonomous representatives of constituent units of the nation.62
In the United States, for example, the Senate provides states with such a forum.
In Spain, by contrast, Autonomous Communities are largely excluded from the national
councils of governance. Although the Spanish Parliament is bicameral, and includes a chamber
denominated a “Senate,”63 the Spanish Senate differs from those found in bicameral federal
states. The Spanish Constitution defines the Senate as “the House of territorial
60
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representation.”64 The territories represented, however, are not autonomously self-governing
subnational units – they are not, in other words, the Autonomous Communities. They are
instead “provinces,” which are by definition subunits of territories that may seek recognition as
Autonomous Communities.65 In the United States, this arrangement would correspond to one in
which the U.S. Constitution guaranteed senatorial representation to counties rather than states.
The Spanish Constitution does go on to authorize each Autonomous Community to designate
one senator, plus an additional senator for each million inhabitants it contains.66 However, the
structure of these constitutional rules ensures that senators who directly represent the
Autonomous Communities as Communities are far outnumbered by those representing individual
provinces. As a result, not only must Autonomous Communities seek approval from the
Spanish Parliament every time they wish to create or amend their Statutes of Autonomy, but they
also have no official voice in formal decision making processes by which Parliament deals with
such requests.

2. Development of Extraconstitutional Avenues of Influence
It seems clear from the foregoing analysis that formal national power in Spain far
outstrips subnational power, and that the degree to which national power predominates over
subnational power in Spain far exceeds the degree to which it does so in the United States.
Nevertheless, even in an environment that seems extremely hostile to the exercise of subnational
influence over policy-making at the national level, the Spanish Autonomous Communities have
64
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begun to develop methods of doing just that. These efforts have been slow. Progress has been
unsystematic. Some of the mechanisms for asserting subnational influence are rudimentary and
undeveloped. But Spain’s new constitutional regime is young, and we think it is fair to say that
the groundwork is already being laid to create a system of national-subnational relations that is
much more complex, more nuanced, and more balanced than the lopsided allocation of power
described above. Under its present constitutional regime, Spain may never be a genuine federal
state. But it does not follow that Spain cannot be a meaningfully decentralized state in which
subnational units enjoy a measure of real autonomy within their own borders and real influence
in Madrid.
In this section, we briefly describe a few leading examples of emerging mechanisms that
Spanish subnational units have been developing to augment the limited autonomy and influence
that the formal provisions of the Spanish Constitution accord them.
1.

Supplication. Under the Spanish Constitution, the most direct method by which

Autonomous Communities can gain a greater measure of autonomy and self-governance is
simply and straightforwardly by asking for it. In principle, the Spanish Constitution holds out to
the Autonomies the possibility of assuming a fair amount of power. Granting such requests lies
within the complete discretion of Parliament, and it therefore need not grant Autonomous
Communities all or even any of the autonomous power they seek. On the other hand, it may do
so if it wishes. The trick therefore lies in obtaining the necessary parliamentary approval.
In many cases – indeed, in most – Parliament has seen fit to exercise its discretion
beneficently. For example, Statutes of Autonomy proposed by the Autonomous Communities
of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Aragon, Castilla León, Galicia, and Andalusia passed easily

25

and without controversy.67 On the other hand, although the central state may devolve power
through an exercise of beneficence, such power is held insecurely; what has been unilaterally
granted may be unilaterally revoked.
2.

Political Influence. A highly significant avenue that Spanish subnational units

have employed to protect their interests and to influence national policy making is political
influence exercised through the medium of political parties. Spain is a multiparty democracy68
in which about a dozen parties are regularly able to elect at least one member of the
parliamentary lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies. Two large and powerful parties of
nationwide scope and appeal tend to predominate: the Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido
Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE), the main party of the left; and the People’s Party (Partido
Popular, or PP), the main party of the right. Despite their size, however, neither party typically
is able to command an outright majority in the Chamber, meaning that the major parties
frequently must form coalitions with minor parties to govern or to enact and defeat specific
pieces of legislation. Many of the largest potential coalition partners are parties of primarily
regional appeal. These include the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de
Catalunya, or ERC); Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió), a coalition of two Catalan
parties; the Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, or EAJ); the Canarian Coalition
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(Coalición Canaria, or CC); and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, or
BNG) – all parties based primarily in specific self-governing subnational communities.69
This arrangement creates two potentially important opportunities for subnational
influence over national policy. First, of course, where a national governing coalition includes a
party with a strong base in an Autonomous Community, the interests of that Autonomous
Community must be taken into account if the dominant member of the coalition is to bring along
its partners. Second, where parliamentary representation is closely divided, the dominant parties
must bring along their own members, including those members elected from Autonomous
Communities that might have particular interests they wish to advance within the major parties
themselves. In both cases, it may be possible for representatives elected from the Autonomies
to strike deals favorable to the interests of subnational power in general, or their individual
constituencies in particular.
A stark example of this phenomenon is the drastically different treatment accorded by
Parliament to requests by Catalonia and the Basque Country for approval of amendments to their
respective Statutes of Autonomy. In 2005, both Autonomies formally requested that Parliament
approve significant amendments to their Statutes of Autonomy. For reasons that will be
described in more detail below, both proposals were perceived by the central state as
controversial and threatening to national unity. In the end, however, Parliament approved the
Catalan amendments but not the Basque amendments, which it continues to resist.70 The
decisive difference was that the same political party, PSOE, governed in both Catalonia and in
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Madrid, and the central government needed the support of the Catalan minor parties (CIU or
ERC) in the Chamber of Deputies to accomplish the national political agenda.

In the Basque

case, in contrast, the central government (PSOE) did not need support in the Chamber of
Deputies of the Basque political parties (PNV/EA). As a result, Catalonia obtained a new
Statute of Autonomy, but the Basque Country has not.
3.

Popular Political Mobilization. Another method for achieving political influence

that is much more widely used in Spain than in the United States is mass popular political
mobilization – i.e., public demonstrations. Massive demonstrations and boycotts have been
used on many occasions to generate pressure to affect the political agendas of the central state or
the Autonomous Communities. These events are frequently orchestrated by political parties as a
means of obtaining what they cannot achieve through the exercise of formal political power, but
may also be organized by private groups with political or religious agendas.
An example of how popular political mobilization can be utilized by subnational units to
influence national policy is the case of the “Papers of Salamanca,” a conflict that pitted the
Spanish State against the Generalitat of Catalonia. The dispute related to the ownership of
certain documents, files, pictures, and personal letters held in the General Archive of the Spanish
Civil War housed in Salamanca. The main collection of the Archive was assembled at the
conclusion of the Civil War by the Delegación del Estado para la recuperación de documentos,
located in Salamanca, in the Autonomous Community of Castilla y León. This government
agency gathered up documents, pictures, and effects that the Franco troops had obtained from the
different fronts of the Civil War and deposited them in Salamanca.71

71

See official website of the Archivo, http://www.mcu.es/archivos/MC/AGC/Presentacion/

Historia.html.

28

Since the end of the War, families and other individuals in Catalonia and Valencia, as
well as the Catalan government itself, have asked for the return of these materials to their
original owners. After numerous claims and failed negotiations, the Spanish Government in
1995 agreed to the return to Catalonia of papers claimed to be of Catalan origin and ownership.
Less than two weeks after execution of this agreement, a massive public demonstration in
Salamanca protested movement of the papers to Catalonia. In sympathy with these
demonstrations, the Mayor of Salamanca went so far as to order the municipal police to guard
the entry to the Archive. In the face of this public pressure, the Spanish Government backed
down, and decided instead to convene a commission of experts to study the question of
ownership. Proceedings dragged on until 2002 when, in consideration of the recommendations
of a badly divided commission, the Spanish Government decided that all documentation prior to
1936 should remain in Salamanca. Actual return of the later documents has since been tied up
in court.72
Interestingly, the use of popular mobilization is not confined to efforts by the periphery to
influence the center; sometimes interests that support political positions that are held by a
national majority, and which are well represented in Parliament, will organize demonstrations
against minoritarian policies or assertions of power by individual Autonomous Communities.
For example, when the Catalan Parliament (Generalitat) approved the amendment to the Catalan
Statute of Autonomy mentioned above, several Spanish associations and media organizations
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invoked the tactics of popular mobilization to urge a boycott of Catalan products for the express
purpose of inducing a change in Catalan policy.73
4.

External Influences. One avenue by which Spanish subnational units may

influence the central state that is entirely unavailable to subnational units in the United States is
by appealing to institutions outside the state that are able to exercise influence within it. By far
the most significant of these external institutions are the European Union and the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR). For example, the Basque Country has sued the Spanish State in the
ECHR on two occasions in an attempt to reverse disliked policies of the Spanish government.
In one case, Basque individuals and a Basque political party sued Spain over a law that banned a
Basque political party, and in another case the Basque Government sued the Spanish State to
invalidate a decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court holding that the Basque government
lacks authority to put a referendum to Basque voters.74
In addition to the ECHR, Autonomous Communities have occasionally appealed to the
European Parliament. For example, in 2007, in response to petitions received from numerous
individuals, private groups, and the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Andalusia, the
European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions undertook an investigation of coastal and urban
development policies in the País Valencià. After a visit to the region and a wide-ranging
investigation, the Committee issued a report harshly critical of development policies applied in
the region:
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The Petitions Committee remains concerned and deeply troubled as a result of the
persistent and long-standing denial of the legitimate rights of many European
citizens in Spain, most notably in the Valencian Region, to their land and their
homes. They have become the collateral victims of many rampant urbanisation
programmes founded upon legislation which provides privilege and wealth for the
urbaniser and which denies individuals their very integrity.
In a large number of documented cases town councils have concocted urban
development plans less because of their real requirements related to population
growth and tourism, more because of what often appears as their greed and
avarice. . . . In no other EU country are citizens’ rights to their property abused
in this way or to this extent, and no petitions from any other EU country on such
matters have been received.75
The Committee concluded by calling for further action by the European Commission and by
Spanish regional authorities.
Another kind of supranational institution to which Spanish subnational units have from
time to time appealed when thwarted by the central state are private international federations.
Such appeals have been especially successful in the area of international sports competition. As
a matter of law, Spain does not permit Basque and Catalan teams to compete in international
competitions, a decision that reverses a long tradition of such teams appearing as representatives
of their historical communities. The Basque and Catalan Autonomous Communities protested
enactment of the law, and later challenged it in the Constitutional Court, which upheld the ban in
75
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a 1998 decision.76 Since then, Catalan sports federations have taken their case directly to
international sporting organizations and federations, where they have enjoyed considerable
success, achieving recognition – and the right to compete as Catalan teams alongside Spanish
teams – in bowling, rowing, racquetball, korfball, pitch and putt, twirling, Australian football,
and futsal.77
5.

Violence and Defiance. Finally, although resort to violence, or defiance backed

by the threat of violence, is used sparingly in the United States, it is essentially unheard of in
Spain as a tool of official policy. The European experience of war in general, and the Spanish
experience of civil war in particular, is simply too fresh and too frightening to permit
government officials recourse to this avenue of influence. Threats of violence by subnational
officials would be ill received not only by the central government, but by subnational
populations as well.78

C. CONCLUSIONS
It is of course hazardous to draw conclusions from parsimonious data, and here we have
examined a comparatively small number of examples in only two countries. Still, with this
caution in mind, we think what we have shown is sufficient to permit us to suggest some very
tentative conclusions that warrant further study in other settings.
76

Providència del Tribunal Constitucional de Septembre 26, 1998, confirm per Auto 35/1999,

February 9, 1999.
77

E.g., decision of T.A.S, April 23, 2008, in Catalan Federation of Bowling vs. Spanish Bowling

Federation.
78

This is not to say that violence – even overtly separatist violence – has not played a role in Spanish
political life. Nevertheless, such violence and the threat of it have been employed by private, unofficial groups
from which governing authorities have been at great pains to distance themselves.

32

First, subnational actors in federal systems seem capable of developing an extensive and
in many cases creative array of extraconstitutional methods to influence national power.
Federalism in the United States was designed to be strongly decentralized, but over time evolved
into a much more strongly national system. Yet despite the pragmatic and, increasingly, formal
constitutional dominance of American national power, the states have nonetheless developed,
and continue to maintain, a broad pallette of methods by which to advance their interests in the
processes of national decision making. Spain’s initial constitutional allocation of power tilted
even more decisively toward the central state. Yet despite the presence of an explicit, highly
forcing constitutional structure, Spain’s formal centralization has not in practice inhibited the
development of a relatively robust system of subnational decentralization based on meaningfully
mutual checking of power.
Initial asymmetries of power constructed by constitutional design (or, in the American
case, by constitutional evolution), we therefore tentatively conclude from these examples, can
thus be altered by informal arrangements and workarounds, moderating any dangers of
instability posed by ill-advised or poorly executed baseline constitutional endowments. It
follows that a vertically symmetrical initial constitutional allocation of power may be less
important than the Madisonian model predicts because of the ability of official actors to develop
significant extraconstitutional methods of mutual influence.
Second, in both the United States and Spain – two very different political environments
constituted by very different regimes of power sharing – ostensibly weak subnational units have
managed to develop extraconstitutional methods for protecting their interests and influencing
national policy that are reasonably effective at least some of the time. This does not mean that
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national power does not and will not continue to predominate in both nations. It does mean,
however, that the dominance of national power is not nearly as complete as it may seem from a
reading of the constitutions themselves or their interpretations by national courts. We suspect
that close investigation in other nations of how subnational power is exercised on the ground will
reveal a host of examples similar to those described here.
Despite their different constitutional structures and substantially different allocations of
national and subnational power, then, the conditions for sustainable decentralization seem to
have evolved in both the United States and Spain. Nevertheless, although sustainable
decentralization seems well entrenched in the United States, in Spain it is threatened. As we
have shown, however, this threat does not arise from the obvious source: a constitutional
allocation of power that tilts heavily in favor of centralization. It arises instead from the
asymmetrical relations that Spanish subnational units enjoy with the central state. We turn now
to this more serious problem.

IV. ASYMMETRY IN SUBNATIONAL RELATIONS TO NATIONAL POWER
A. The Assumption of Horizontal Symmetry in Contestatory Federalism
A frequently overlooked yet highly important assumption of the Madisonian conception
of contestatory federalism is that the American states would fundamentally share a deep,
common interest in the restraint of national power. The American Framers did not, of course,
contemplate that the states themselves would exhibit any particular uniformity; they understood
from their own experience that the states would likely diverge in size, population, resources,
history, customs, legal traditions, and preferences regarding the details of self-governance.
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Indeed, the Framers expressly relied on an anticipated diversity of interests within the states in
justifying the large geographic extent of the proposed new nation.79
Nevertheless, the Framers did believe strongly, even axiomatically, that all American
states, whatever their other characteristics, would possess essentially uniform interests with
respect to the national government. First, the Framers evidently thought it perfectly clear that
all the states should, and would, exhibit a healthy fear of the national government. Although
members of the founding generation differed on the question of how much power ought ideally
to be allocated to the central government, they shared the belief that at some point the degree to
which power is centralized can become excessive, raising the danger of central tyranny.80 This
view, they clearly believed, would be shared by the states and would form a reliable and
universal foundation for state policy decisions respecting the national government.
Second, the Framers assumed that the states, because they feared excessively centralized
power, would share a common interest in ensuring that the national government be prevented
from accumulating a dangerous measure of power.81 Finally, the Framers assumed that the
states would act cooperatively rather than competitively should efforts become necessary to hold
the power of the national government within constitutional limits. If threatened, in other words,
the states would join forces to make common cause against the national government:
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against
79
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invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation
cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetration of select
bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means
of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all
the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt
a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the
community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different
States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common
liberty. . . . If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance in one State,
the distant States would be able to make head with fresh forces. The advantages
obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and
the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its
efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.82
On this view, the states will respond to the threat of central tyranny not by competing with one
another for the favor or mercy of a dangerous national government, but by rising in unison
against a threat to any of them. This was, indeed, the model of resistance to central authority
that the Framers knew from the Revolution. The various colonies may have had different tastes
for engaging in open resistance to Great Britain, but once the course of events became clear, each
colony stood shoulder to shoulder alongside the others.
This kind of symmetry of interests and motivations is, it turns out, a critical assumption
underwriting the Madisonian model of contestatory federalism. If, in times of crisis,
subnational governments do not stand together against national power, their ability successfully
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to resist it will be badly compromised. If some subnational units attempt to pursue their own
interests unilaterally, either by seeking favor with the national government by betraying one
another, or by adopting positions of neutrality in national-subnational conflicts, or by
affirmatively allying themselves with the national power against other subnational units, the
ability of the national government to control the course of events will be greatly strengthened.
Over the long run, such behavior risks undermining severely the ability of subnational
governments to resist future encroachments on their interests by the national government, either
individually or collectively.
In the United States, the Madisonian assumption of symmetry in subnational relations to
the national government has held up well. American states do not typically compete with one
another for the favor of the national government, and the states seem consistently to have
perceived their own interests against Washington as common interests shared generally by all the
states.83 To be sure, representatives of the states in Congress may compete among one another
for scarce federal benefits – the siting of military bases or government offices, for example, or
allocations of public works funding. Members of Congress from different states also frequently
compete with one another on questions of policy that have ramifications for the welfare of
individual states or regions – whether, for example, federal policy should support rural or urban
areas, or agricultural or industrial interests, and so on. But these competitions are never
understood as competitions among states for the favor of the national government; they are
instead understood as competitions among national constituency groups and interests. A state
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seeking national investment is not offering its friendship and support as a sovereign to the central
state, but is merely engaged in a collective politics of distribution, a kind of politics that in fact
contributes to the perception that all states stand on a footing of equality before national power.
As a result, in the United States, when subnational governments do act to check national power,
they nearly always do so in a way that is uniform and collective.84
Finally, on those rare occasions when American states do engage in rivalries in their
capacity as autonomous sovereigns, those disputes are typically resolved as a matter of law in the
courts – not as a matter of politics in Congress. Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between states acting in their sovereign
capacity. The Court has exercised this authority to resolve disputes between states over the
location of borders, jurisdiction over taxable resources, and rights in natural resources85 – the
very kinds of disputes that in other times and places might be resolved through highly politicized
negotiation brokered by the central state. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution affords states few
opportunities for appealing to Congress to intervene in such disputes, thereby reducing the risk
that one state will appear to enjoy greater favor with the central government than another.86
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B. Spain: The Problem of Horizontal Asymmetry in Relations with the Central State
1. Subnational Disputes over the Scope of Subnational Autonomy
In sharp contrast to the American case, in Spain the tools of extraconstitutional influence
have been developed and from time to time used asymmetrically by the various Autonomous
Communities. Whereas some Autonomous Communities seem to feel a strong need continually
to develop and exploit extraconstitutional methods for influencing exercises of national power,
others do not. One reason for this diversity seems to be that not all Autonomies fear the Spanish
central state in the manner anticipated by the model of contestatory federalism. On the contrary,
the Autonomies seem to diverge substantially in the degree to which they feel some sense of
solidarity with, or indeed ownership of, the Spanish state.
Moreover, contrary to the assumptions of the Madisonian model of contestatory
federalism, some Spanish Autonomous Communities seem to fear other Autonomous
Communities more than they fear the central state itself.

Consequently, Autonomies such as

Andalusia and Castilla La Mancha, which enjoy close and comfortable relationships with Spain,
have far less cordial relationships with Autonomies such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, and
Galicia, which they seem to believe pose a greater long-term threat to their welfare than the
national government. Spanish subnational units thus disagree regularly about perhaps the single
most important characteristic of any system of decentralized power: whether and to what extent
autonomy and power should be devolved from the central state in the first instance.
As a result, the Autonomous Communities sometimes make very different choices about
how to use whatever kinds of influence with the national government they may possess. Some
Autonomies use their influence mainly to advance policies that they support for the direct benefit
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of their own populations. Others, however, sometimes use their influence not so much to
advance directly their own interests, but to induce the national government to control other
Autonomies that they perceive as threatening, or to improve their position vis à vis other
Autonomies with which they understand themselves to be in competition. Thus, in
contradiction of a basic condition of the Madisonian model, Spanish subnational units will from
time to time exercise their autonomous power and influence in ways that are not calculated to
advance the interests of all autonomies collectively against the central state. This in turn creates
conditions conducive to a potentially debilitating failure of successful decentralization: the
central state playing favorites among competing subnational units. Some examples will help to
illustrate this phenomenon.
1.

Competition among Autonomies: Café para todos. In one of its healthier

manifestations, rivalry among regions led to a somewhat comical competition to be recognized
first as Autonomous Communities (in 1978), and then as “historical nationalities” under the
Spanish Constitution. Under the process contemplated by the 1978 Constitution, three regions
of Spain with claims to distinctive national identities based on history, language, and culture –
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia – were granted a substantial degree of autonomy
under a fast-track procedure.87 Even before the Spanish Constitution was approved, however,
other regions with perhaps less well-grounded claims to recognition as distinctive nationalities
began to assert a right to similar treatment. These others, when presenting Statutes of
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Autonomy for approval to Parliament, included provisions claiming nationality status.88 This
development was eventually dubbed “café para todos” (coffee for everybody) by its critics.
We deem this a relatively healthy manifestation of competition among Autonomous
Communities because, although it grew from a distrust or suspicion among subnational units, it
manifested itself in positive claims by those units for more and parallel autonomy from the
central state. Thus, subnational units presented a relatively united front in their dealings with
the central state. This has not, however, always been the case.
2.

Selective Subnational Opposition to Assumption of Competencies. One arena in

which a more destructive kind of competition among Autonomous Communities has arisen
concerns the content of the various Statutes of Autonomy. The Statutes of Autonomy, it will be
recalled, serve as subnational constitutions for the Autonomous Communities, and one of the
most important functions of these documents is to serve as the vehicle by which Autonomies
formally adopt competencies that the Spanish Constitution authorizes them to assume. In the
first round of approval of the various Statutes of Autonomy, the Autonomous Communities
generally did not adopt all of the powers available to them, and in subsequent rounds of proposed
amendments, many of the Autonomies have therefore sought to adopt additional competencies
from the constitutionally authorized list.
From time to time, some Autonomies have reacted very differently to proposals by
various Autonomous Communities to amend their Statutes of Autonomy in similar or identical
ways. In some of the more extreme cases, Autonomies have taken legal action to oppose
amendments in one Autonomy that they have not opposed when proposed by others.
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For example, after an arduous political process, Catalonia in 2006 successfully obtained
parliamentary approval of extensive amendments to its Statute of Autonomy.89 The
amendments included provisions dealing with nationality and subnational identity, historical
rights, criminal law enforcement, assumption of competencies, relations with the European
Union, and access to the European Court of Justice, among many others.
Shortly after Parliament approved the amendments, the Autonomous Communities of
Valencia, Murcia, la Rioja, the Balearic Islands, and Aragon, along with the Partido Popular, the
political party governing in most of these Autonomies, filed suit in the Spanish Constitutional
Court challenging the constitutionality of thirty different provisions of the Catalan
amendments.90 At the same time, however, many of the same provisions of the Catalan Statute
that were challenged in the lawsuit also exist in the Statutes of Autonomy of Aragon, Andalusia,
and Valencia without provoking either comment or opposition.91
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In a separate action in the Constitutional Court, Valencia sued to invalidate an
amendment to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy assuming competence for the planning,
construction and exploitation of hydraulic projects.92 Under this provision, Catalonia assumed
responsibility for “waters that belong to intra-community hydrographic basins.”93 In contrast,
when Aragon in 2007 adopted an identical provision assuming competence over internal
waters,94 Valencia took no action, and indeed has never protested.
In a decentralized system of government, in which by hypothesis national power must be
counterbalanced by adequate subnational power – and must be accompanied by a degree of
autonomy adequate to use it independently on behalf of the interests of the subnational
population – these kinds of action bear obvious risks. Normally, one would expect all
subnational units to have virtually identical interests in the range and breadth of the
competencies that may constitutionally be exercised by any subnational unit. Such decisions
address the theoretical limits of permissible subnational power, and presumably all subnational
units have an equivalent interest in seeing that the scope of their potential powers is interpreted
as broadly as possible.
This is not to say that a subnational unit should in every set of circumstances wish to
wield power to which it may potentially resort. Not all problems are best addressed at the
subnational level, and there is no theoretical objection in any system of decentralized power to
the cooperative exercise of authority at the national and subnational levels. Thus, in some or
even many circumstances subnational units might be well advised to refrain from exercising
92
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power that they possess. But it is quite another thing for a subnational unit to take the position
that the assumption of a power by another subnational unit is not one that constitutionally may be
exercised by any subnational unit, or by particular subnational units out of many.95 The pursuit
of such a strategy by Valencia, Murcia, la Rioja, the Balearic Islands, and Aragon does not
weaken Catalonia alone; it bears the potential to weaken all the Autonomous Communities
collectively in their relation to the central Spanish state. The risk inherent in this strategy is all
the more striking because of the drastic tilt of the constitutional balance of power in favor of the
central Spanish state, and the fact that the central state has been a proven source of danger in the
very recent past. The only possible explanation for such behavior is that these Autonomies
distrust some Autonomous Communities not only more than they distrust Spain, but more than
they distrust other Autonomies. This is a degree of distrust that seems potentially detrimental to
the long-term success and stability of Spanish decentralization.

2. Lack of Institutions of Collective Subnational Influence
Clearly, many factors contribute to the rivalry among Spanish subnational units, and
among these are real and legitimate differences among the Autonomous Communities
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themselves, including divergent historical, cultural, and linguistic considerations. However,
unlike many other federal states, Spain lacks institutional arrangements that might help
ameliorate inter-Autonomy rivalries and channel assertions of subnational autonomy and power
in more productive ways.
Perhaps surprisingly, there seems to be no tradition in Spain of generally shared
subjective feelings of collective opposition to central power and tyranny. Throughout the long
course of Spanish history, there has never been a “Spain” in which all regions were treated
equally by the central state, or in which they equally feared it. From 1492 until 1712, Spain was
constituted of different political entities enjoying varying degrees of mutual independence.
After the War of Spanish Succession, which concluded in 1714, the Crown of Catalonia and
Aragon lost its political and economic independence in favor of Castilla. The Basque Country,
in contrast, because it supported the winning side, continued for a time to enjoy substantial
autonomy.96 Thus, the origins of present-day Spain are based to some degree on the military
superiority of one nation over another and the shifting fortunes of allies of one contestant or
another in nationwide and European power struggles. Even in recent history, moreover,
different regions experienced the rule of the Spanish Republic of 1936 and the dictatorship of
Franco differently, with some winners and losers, again working against the development of a
unified attitude among the regions toward the central state.
Against this background, and perhaps in part because of it, present-day Spanish political
intercourse has failed to produce institutional frameworks in which Autonomous Communities
might work together, cooperatively, either against or in concert with national power. We have
already mentioned the absence of a legislative chamber (senate) that represents the interests of
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Autonomies as Autonomies. But Spain lacks more than formal venues for the development of a
collective subnational politics; it lacks even informal arrangements that might support such a
politics.
In the United States, such institutions not only exist, but operate with great effectiveness.
Informal organizations such as the National Governors’ Association and the National Conference
of State Legislatures serve as informational clearing houses for all states, develop common
policy positions and common legislative responses to national initiatives, and coordinate
collective lobbying efforts on behalf of collective subnational interests. In Spain, no such
organizations exist.97 Leaders of the Autonomous Communities deal with one another
independently, through the intermediation of nationwide political parties, or not at all. There is,
in short, no institutional arrangement in which Autonomous Communities cooperate as
Communities with a set of shared institutional interests.

3. Impact of Requirement of Central Approval of Subnational Autonomy
Finally, the Spanish constitutional rules structuring the process by which self-governing
subnational units acquire autonomy very likely contribute to the problems of
national-subnational relations in Spain. Under the Spanish Constitution, Autonomous
Communities must gain central approval for each element of subnational autonomy they seek to
adopt, and the process by which the Constitution requires that they obtain this permission is a
petition to the central parliament, followed by a formal process of negotiation, after which the
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central authority may grant the petition or not in its complete discretion.98 This arrangement
thus demands that the Autonomies approach the Spanish state in the capacity of one sovereign
addressing another, and even worse, in the capacity of a weak sovereign seeking the grace of a
stronger one – a transaction not unlike ones that were commonplace during an earlier period of
Spanish history: a vassal coming on bended knee to the royal court to seek privileges from a
monarch.
This kind of institutional structure, it seems to us, has two effects that might impede the
emergence of a stable and sustainable decentralized state. First, forcing subnational units
continually to seek the blessing of the central state as a condition of undertaking autonomous
self-government simply encourages the continual politicization of national-subnational relations.
In the United States and in most other federal states, by contrast, questions of subnational
autonomy are answered not by the politically bestowed grace of the central state, but by law,
inscribed permanently in the national constitution. In such systems, subnational units decide
what powers to exercise based on their own best interpretations of the constitution, not on their
political estimation of what the central state might be willing to tolerate. If they attempt to
exceed their constitutionally authorized powers, they will be called to account not by whatever
political opposition rivals are able opportunistically to marshal within the central government,
but by courts impartially enforcing the law.
Second, the Spanish system of requiring central approval reinforces subnational corporate
identity in ways that are not necessarily beneficial. One of the strengths of federal systems, and
a source of their capacity for endurance, is the way in which they complicate the identity of
subnational units. A provincial government in a federal system is for some purposes the
98
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democratically legitimate voice of a distinct self-governing polity, yet for other purposes is
nothing more than a geographically organized constituency of the national polity.99 When a
subnational government petitions the central state for benefits in its capacity as only one of many
national constituencies, the decision is much more likely to be framed and understood on both
sides as resting on the ordinary distributional and administrative considerations upon which
national governments routinely rely. When, on the other hand, a subnational government
approaches the central state as a sovereign seeking permission to rule its own people, the
possibility is increased that any decision will be understood as reflecting considerations of
corporate bilateral relations that are unique to the subnational unit making the request. By
forcing Autonomous Communities to petition and negotiate for the very powers that will make
them self-governing polities, the Spanish constitutional system tends to force the transaction into
the second, more highly charged mold. This reinforces subnational corporate identity as
something distinct from national identity, thereby promoting precisely the sense of regional
identity and nationalism that the Spanish Constitution was intended to manage.
In no case is this tendency more starkly evident than in the extremely tense and
confrontational series of events surrounding the recent Basque petition to Parliament for
approval of amendments to its Statute of Autonomy (the Ibarretxe Plan).

The present Basque

Statute of Autonomy was approved by Parliament in 1979. The Statute contains some unusual
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features, worked out as part of the 1978 Spanish constitutional settlement, that are based in
historical rights of the Basque Country predating the Franco regime.100
In early 2005, the Basque Country forwarded to Madrid a set of dramatically revised
amendments to its Statute of Autonomy.101 These amendments staked out a position on
subnational autonomy far more extreme than any previously proposed by an Autonomous
Community. The Preamble, in language that could not have been understood as anything but
provocative, referred to the Basque as “a People with its own identity within the community of
European peoples,” and claimed for that people “the right to decide their own future . . . in
accordance with the right to self-determination of all peoples.”102 The working provisions of the
proposed Statute described the Basque right of self-determination as the right to “form a Basque
Community, freely associated with the Spanish State”;103 recognized a right of residents of the
Basque Community to “Basque citizenship”;104 and extended Basque citizenship and political
rights to members of the “Basque diaspora,” wherever located.105
The proposed amendments also authorized the conclusion of agreements and joint
ventures with the neighboring Autonomous Community of Navarre, in direct contravention of
Article 145 of the Spanish Constitution, which, the relevant provision claimed, “shall not,
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therefore, be applicable” to such agreements;106 and declared the right of the Basque Community
to “direct representation in the organisations of the European Union.”107 The document also
authorized the Basque citizenry to decide by referendum whether to “make complete or
substantial changes in the format and regime of political relations with the Spanish State, as well
as their relations with Europe and the international community,” and purported to direct the
Spanish state to respect such decisions;108 and purported to replace the authority of the Spanish
Constitutional Court to decide questions of the constitutionality of the exercise of national and
subnational power with a bilateral commission in which any differences would be worked out
politically.109 In short, the amendments proposed a framework for a unilateral Basque decision
to leave the Spanish state, and did so in a way that did not express a great deal of respect for the
existing Spanish Constitution.110
This proposal was met with immediate and intense hostility by the Spanish government,
the political parties, the media, and even, ominously, the military. Under the Spanish
Constitution, proposed amendments to Statutes of Autonomy are to be taken up initially by a
parliamentary committee for the purpose of negotiating an agreement between the Autonomy
and the central state.111 Such a negotiation in this case was refused outright, and the
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government indicated that it had no intention of taking legislative action of any kind on the
Basque proposal. The Basque President then responded by proposing that a referendum be put
to the Basque electorate on questions indirectly relevant to the larger issue of Basque
self-determination.112

The Spanish government then filed suit in the Spanish Constitutional

Court to block such a referendum. In a 2008 ruling, the Constitutional Court declared the
referendum beyond the scope of subnational competence under the Spanish Constitution.113 The
Basque Country has since threatened repeatedly to challenge this decision in the European Court
of Human Rights, although at this writing has not yet done so.
Based on our private interviews of Basque officials, including Lekhendakari (Basque
President) Juan José Ibarretxe Markuartu,114 we believe that an important factor contributing to
this unfortunate escalation of conflict was a miscalculation on the part of Basque leaders that is
traceable in large part to the constitutional structure for amending Statutes of Autonomy.
Consistent with the structure and sequence of constitutional formalities, Basque officials
understood the process for amending their Statute of Autonomy as one of sovereign-to-sovereign
political negotiations. Accordingly, they conceived of the initial draft of proposed amendments
as an opening position in what they expected would be a multi-round process of negotiations.
Like many parties entering what they understand to be a potentially complex negotiation, the
Basques took an opening position that was considerably more extreme than the position at which
112
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they expected to arrive by the conclusion of the negotiations. In the event, this turned out to be
a miscalculation because the Basque opening position was perceived by the Spanish state as
being so far beyond the bounds of potential agreement as to make any discussion a waste of time.
However, both parties understood correctly that, in the context of the amendment
proceedings, the negotiation would not be between the Spanish state and one of its constituency
groups, but between the Spanish state and the Basque Autonomous Community in its corporate
or quasi-sovereign capacity. Consequently, the Spanish rejection of the Basque position was
understood by all concerned as a rejection of a certain claim to self-governance by a unique
polity seeking recognition of its autonomy. Such a rejection is not legal but fundamentally
political, and strikes not at the distributional aspirations of a national constituency but at the
aspirations for sovereignty of a self-constituting political community. This isn’t just business;
it’s personal. And this background context, in turn, helps explain why neither party thus far has
found the will to turn back from the path of continuing escalation of the level of confrontation.

CONCLUSION
Sustainable federalism may well be the form of territorial organization most conducive to
the long-term safety and prosperity of the modern state. We have argued here that constitutional
design matters to the sustainability of decentralized power, but in ways that are different from
those conventionally advanced. It is typically thought that the critical feature in the
constitutionalization of a sustainable federalism is a symmetrical distribution of power between
the national and subnational levels. But this is not necessarily the case because subnational
units are frequently able to develop extraconstitutional methods for influencing national power
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that can alter the balance contemplated by formal constitutional structures and allocations of
power. This has been true in both the United States and Spain.
A more important factor in the sustainability of decentralization, we believe, is symmetry
among subnational units in their relation to the central state. In the United States, a highly
stable federal state, symmetrical relations between the states and the central government have
facilitated the successful checking of national power by the states acting collectively and more or
less in unison. In Spain, by contrast, asymmetrical relations between Autonomous Communities
and the central state permit the indulgence of potentially destructive rivalries at the subnational
level that the state may in turn be able to exploit. This asymmetry may prevent the
subnationalities from mounting successful efforts to check national power, thereby endangering
the stability of the state and the long-term prosperity and liberty of its citizens. The most
important problem of political design now facing Spain is therefore how to bring the subnational
units into a common relation to the central state.
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